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Introduction
The almost ubiquitous use of information technology, and modern society’s increasing 
dependence upon it, has ushered in new opportunities for criminal activity.  Potential victims 
now have to protect themselves against perpetrators that they cannot see, and against a variety 
of crime types that can have a significant impact upon both the IT systems and those that use 
them.  The resulting cyber crime has the potential to affect everyone, from large multinational 
organisations down to individuals.  While this also applies to crime in general, a significant 
difference with cyber crime is that, with large-scale attacks like malware and phishing, the 
same incident can affect multiple parties at the same time.  The Internet has enabled global 
reach between attackers and victims, as well as the potential for the attacks themselves to have 
instantaneous effects, irrespective of distance.
The cyber crime problem is not a new one, and related incidents have been occurring in various 
forms for well over three decades. Cyber security industry reporting suggests that the problem 
has not been static - the scale and breadth of some particular forms of cyber attack reported by 
industry appears to have been increasing, as the use of technology has become more 
widespread and its criminal potential has become more widely recognised. In parallel, the 
recognition by governments, business, and legal systems has also increased, as has public 
awareness of at least some of the issues.  However, our ability to accurately measure scale and 
changes in trends for cyber crime (not just attacks), as well as to accurately assess the impacts 
and harms deriving from successful attacks, has generally been limited.   
The aim of the paper is to present a picture of the cyber crime landscape, including the nature 
of the problem and its prominence within the broader context of reported crime as a whole.  
Consideration is also given to the tension that exists between usable and accurate classification 
of cyber crime incidents, recognising the importance of categorisation in terms of what is then 
measured, which in turn influences how fully we can understand the landscape in practice.  In 
order to frame the discussion alongside clear data, the paper draws upon crime survey findings 
and reporting structures from relevant UK sources.  While these will differ from approaches in 
other locations, this in itself provides some further evidence of the challenge in assessing cyber 
crime on a wider, international scale. The discussion ultimately leads to a recognition of the 
prevalence of technology within the context of crime in general, and a resulting consideration 
of what should truly be regarded as cyber crime, as opposed to cases in which technology has 
simply become a natural factor within traditional crimes.
Defining Cyber Crime
The problem of crime linked to our use of computers is hardly new, and related literature can 
be found dating back to the 1970s (McKnight, 1973). However, the nature of the crimes has 
significantly changed over the years as organisations (and society in general) have become 
more technology-dependent, and others have found more ways to attack and exploit it.  As an 
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example, back in 1981 the UK Audit Inspectorate’s survey of computer fraud was essentially 
focused around a few categories relating to fraud and theft.  By the time the last survey in this 
series was conducted in 2005i, the survey title had changed to ICT Fraud and Abuse, and the 
list of reporting categories had grown to include hacking, denial of service, viruses, and various 
other entries driven by our widespread technology uptake (Audit Commission, 2005).  Mass 
adoption of the Internet has added various further dimensions to the problem (Jewkes and Yar, 
2010), and current surveys routinely add yet more terms, including phishing and ransomware, 
to the related vocabulary (reflecting the ongoing advance of both the technology and the ways 
in which users and systems can be attacked).  All the while, there remains a lack of clear 
agreement and consistency around the classification of threats and the crimes related to them.
Indeed, much of the discussion on cyber crime is still dominated by debates around the 
definition of the term, with an increasing tendency to treat every negative online experience 
(e.g. bullying, fraud, harassment) as ‘cyber crime’.  Indeed, a recent volume from McGuire and 
Holt (2017) encompasses sexual offending, interpersonal violence and intellectual property 
theft amongst the various categories of digital crime under consideration.  Such discussion 
shows that while cyber crime is a global issue, we are still far from having a harmonised global 
agreement on either the types of crime, how many there are, or how to handle them. Whilst a 
seemingly academic debate, a clearer and more consistent understanding of what is meant by 
cyber crime and how best to record and capture it, is important for informing not only how we 
understand the threat, but also how we tackle the resulting problems (e.g. from directing the 
use of suitable safeguards within individual systems and organisations through to the 
appropriate allocation of policing resources and targeting of public awareness initiatives).
The varying definitions arise in part because the problem is dynamic and changes over time, 
but also because different sources have tended to assess things from differing perspectives (e.g. 
some may look particularly at external attacks and consequently exclude internal abuse, 
whereas others may focus upon malicious code threats and thereby omit other forms of attack) 
(Furnell et al. 2015).  However, from a top-level perspective, definitions provided by the UK’s 
Serious and Organised Crime Strategy usefully distinguish two broad categories as follows 
(Home Office, 2013):
 Cyber-dependent crimes.  These are offences that can only be committed by using a 
computer, computer networks, or other form of ICT. These acts include the spread of 
viruses and other malicious software, hacking, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attacks (i.e. the flooding of Internet servers to take down network infrastructure or 
websites). Cyber-dependent crimes are primarily acts directed against computers or 
network resources, although there may be secondary outcomes from the attacks, such 
as fraud. 
 Cyber-enabled crimes.  These are traditional crimes that are increased in scale or reach 
by the use of computers, computer networks or other ICT. Unlike cyber-dependent 
crimes, they can still be committed without the use of ICT. Examples can include fraud 
(including phishing and other online scams), theft, and sexual offending against 
children.
Beyond this level, there is no definitive (i.e. internationally accepted and consistently used) 
classification of the cyber crimes themselves, which makes it difficult to track and measure in 
i Then under the guise of the Inspectorate’s successor, the Audit Commission.
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terms of both scale and costs.  Various other definitions and taxonomies of cyber crime can be 
readily identified.  For example, Anderson et al. (2012) used a definition that incorporates 
traditional forms of crime, publication of illegal content, and crimes unique to electronic 
networks.  This set is essentially similar to an earlier classification offered by Wall (2007a), 
which identified computer integrity crime (e.g. hacking and denial of service), computer-
assisted crime (e.g. scams and thefts), and computer content crime (e.g. offensive 
communications).  Meanwhile, Wall also splits cyber crime into three alternative categories, 
namely crimes against the machine, crimes using machines, and crimes in the machine (Wall, 
2007b).  However, none of these can be considered definitive and so surveys and studies readily 
classify and count the same aspects in different ways.  
As an example, Table 1 compares threat/attack categories from two survey reports that were 
current at the time of writing, namely the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2018 from the UK’s 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS, 2018), and the Global Information 
Security Survey 2017-18 from the professional services and accounting firm Ernst & Young 
(EY, 2018).   Looking at the items listed, there is little doubt that all would have the potential 
to be regarded as cyber-related criminal activities.  However, aside from the fact that the CSBS 
list has almost twice as many entries, there are also notable differences in both the groupings 
and granularity, which makes direct comparison rather challenging.  For example, ‘Phishing’ 
from the GISS set maps onto both ‘Fraudulent emails or being directed to fraudulent websites’ 
and ‘Others impersonating organisation in emails or online’ from the CSBS list (and could also 
relate to the rather specific category of ‘Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts’.  
Similarly, the GISS item ‘Malware’ could clearly link to both ‘Viruses, spyware or malware’ 
and ‘Ransomware’ from the CSBS categories.  Meanwhile, both lists contain some categories 
that are presented according to the type of attack (e.g. Denial-of-Service, Malware, Phishing), 
while also having others that are instead linked to the motive or target of the attack (e.g. bank 
accounts, to steal financial information, to steal intellectual property).  
<Insert Table 1 here>
Of course, each of the surveys would doubtless justify and defend its approach, and none of 
the categories are argued to be wrong.  Nonetheless, the resulting differences certainly do not 
aid the task of developing a harmonised view, and the two specific examples are indicative of 
a wider challenge.  Indeed, this disparity between different categorisations can fundamentally 
affect the way in which cyber crime is both understood and measured, the implications of which 
are further explored in later sections.  Prior to this, however, it is also relevant to consider how 
cyber crime now fits within the overall picture of criminal activity that we are now seeing.
A changing picture of crime
The ability to assess the scale and nature of cyber crime experienced amongst the general public 
in England and Wales has improved over recent years, particularly with the introduction of 
new questions and categories in related surveys and reporting. However, in terms of 
understanding the cyber crime ‘landscape’ and the scale and nature of these crimes it is 
important to place it in context of wider, historical crime trends. We know that overall crime 
volumes (excluding fraud and cyber crime), as measured by the Crime Survey for England and 
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Wales (CSEW), have been declining since the mid-ninetiesii. The CSEW is one of the most 
robust measures for assessing long-term trends in crime victimisation amongst the general 
public. It is a face-to-face household survey of adults aged over 16, with a nationally 
representative sample of around 35,000 adultsiii.  However, the CSEW has not historically 
captured fraud and cyber crime and improvement of cyber crime measures more generally is 
only something that has happened relatively recently (see discussion in McGuire and Dowling, 
2013). January 2017 saw the first published statistics where cyber crime and fraud data were 
added to the headline crime count in the surveyiv. The new data showed that in the year ending 
September 2016, traditional crime totalled 6.2m, but with the inclusion of fraud and cyber 
crime, the headline crime estimate totalled 11.8m (ONS, 2017). The following year then saw a 
statistically significant drop of 10% in the estimated total volume of crimes, falling to 10.6m. 
This also included a 24% fall in the volume of computer misuse crimes recorded and a 10% 
fall in fraud (ONS, 2018a). Overall, these developments in measurement have dramatically 
changed our understanding of the crime landscape. In the year ending September 2017, 
computer misuse crimes formed a larger proportion of CSEW crimes than criminal damage 
and violence, whilst fraud was on a par with theft (see Figure 1)v. 
<Insert Figure 1 here>
Further breakdown of the CSEW reveals there were an estimated 1.5m computer misuse crimes 
in the year ending September 2017 (ONS, 2018a). The majority (64%) of computer misuse 
crimes were computer virus reports, and the remainder (36%) related to unauthorised access 
(including hacking)vi. Interestingly, over half of frauds (56%) were regarded by victims to have 
been “cyber-related”. The definition of cyber-related in this case is fairly broad and can include 
any use of the Internet or online activity in the commission of the crime.  As a result, the 
“cyber” aspect of the crime may have related to anything from someone installing spyware to 
undertake an online banking fraud, to a non-existent item being advertised as part of an online 
shopping fraud. There was an (non-significant) increase in such cyber-related frauds from 53% 
in year ending September 2016 to 56% in year ending September 2017 (ONS, 2018a). As Table 
2 outlines, consumer and retail frauds are notable for their volumes of cyber-related frauds. 
<Insert Table 2 here>
Rather than relying upon a single source, the cyber crime landscape needs exploring from a 
range of perspectives and sources in order to gain a fuller understanding of its scale, nature and 
changes over time.  As such, it is interesting to contrast the CSEW findings against other 
ii Although more recently the trend has become more stable. 
iii A major strength of the CSEW is that it captures crimes that are not necessarily reported in an official capacity to the 
police or other organisations, and is not impacted by changes in police crime recording practices. This makes it an 
excellent measure of trends over time. 
iv Fraud and cyber questions were first added to the CSEW in October 2015 as experimental statistics, and asked 
of a half sample.
v CSEW figures are published quarterly on the ONS website and should be consulted to assess the most recent 
changes in trends. 
vi Other types of computer misuse (e.g. DDoS) are captured in the survey but exceptionally few are reported.
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nationally representative data, and an example here is police recorded crime.  Whilst police 
recorded crime is vulnerable to changes in reporting and recording practices by the public and 
police, it has a broader coverage than the CSEW as it also includes businesses, tourists and 
other institutions. It is also a useful source of more high-harm low-volume crimes which are 
not necessarily picked up by the CSEW. Action Fraud (the national reporting centre for fraud 
and cyber crime in the UK) and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) took over 
responsibility from police for reporting and recording cyber crime and fraud from 2011/12 
(although police still hold responsibility for investigating these crimes).  Analysis of cyber 
crime reports made to Action Fraud reveal a different picture to the CSEW. Whilst one in seven 
crimes recorded by the CSEW in the year to September 2017 was a computer misuse offence, 
just one in 245 of all Police Recorded crimes was a computer misuse offence (ONS, 2018a). 
There was a total of 21,745 reported cases of computer misuse in England and Wales in the 
year ending September 2017. Even though this was an increase from the prior year (a 63% 
increase from 13,309 reports), computer misuse crimes accounted for less than one per cent of 
all reported crimes. 
The disparity between CSEW and recorded crime data serves to highlight the high level of 
under-reporting that occursvii.  Only 4.3% of computer misuse incidents were reported to the 
police or Action Fraud in the year ending March 2018 (ONS, 2018b). The most commonly 
reported reason for non-reporting was “haven’t heard of Action Fraud”, but other reasons (such 
as not thinking the incident was worth reporting, or not realising it was a crime) also played a 
part. This probably gives some indication of the perceived seriousness and impact that some of 
these crimes have upon victims. Reporting of crimes however is important in order to better 
understand crime patterns and inform the policing response. 
The benefit of considering the CSEW and Action Fraud sources in more detail is the ability to 
consider cyber ‘crimes’, as opposed to cyber ‘attacks’. Cyber security industry reports (e.g. 
from sources such as F-Secure, Kaspersky Lab, Microsoft, Symantec and others) regularly 
report changing trends in attacks and their findings are well documented elsewhere, along with 
the advantages and limitations of using these types of sources (see McGuire and Dowling, 
2013).  The picture that they tend to present is often a snapshot view of the specific moment in 
time, highlighting particular incidents or issues that have gained attention in the reporting 
period.  For example, contrasting successive releases of Symantec’s Internet Security Threat 
Report, we see that while the 2017 version gives attention toward targeted attacks, email 
threats, web attacks, and ransomware (Symantec, 2017), the 2018 release is structured notably 
differently.  While some top-level categories (e.g. ransomware) remain the same, there are also 
entirely different headings, such as mobile threats and the software supply chain (Symantec, 
2018).  Thus, while they undoubtedly succeed in providing relevant and topical insights, such 
reports are less successful in offering a longitudinal view based upon tracking a consistent set 
of topics.
The challenge of measuring cyber crime
The earlier discussion highlighted the lack of uniform agreement and consistency in terms of 
defining and categorising cyber crime.  Nonetheless, having some formal categorisation and 
consistency comes to matter when looking to count the related crimes. Moreover, the approach 
vii Although this will in part be due to the difference coverage of the sources. 
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used to actually report and record crimes in a policing context can again differ from the 
categories used in more general business surveys such as those discussed in Table 1.  
To look again at a UK example, such counting is based upon formal definitions for cyber crime 
put in place by the Home Office and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB). The Home 
Office Counting Rules (HOCR) set out how all reported crimes, as well as cyber crimes, are to 
be counted and recorded (Home Office, 2018a). Computer misuse crimes are officially 
recorded under the broader category of fraud. Action Fraud crime recorders are required to 
identify the relevant crime type based on information provided by the victim (see Table 3). 
These then go on to inform key measures on police recorded crime, published each quarter by 
the Office for National Statistics (e.g. ONS, 2017; ONS 2018a). Such crime recording helps to 
raise awareness of scale and changes over time regarding different crime types, helps with 
prioritisation and development of appropriate responses to crimes by law enforcement, and 
helps ensure that victims receive the appropriate service (Home Office, 2014).
<Insert Table 3 here>
The HOCR set out a number of important rules relating to defining and categorising crimes to 
help ensure consistency and accuracy in recording. These rules apply in principle for all crime 
types, and each specific crime type listed in the counting rules has its own description and 
examples of how the rules are to be applied. Key rules include the principal crime rule that 
relates to recording of the most serious offence where multiple offences occur, and the specific 
intended victim rule (Home Office, 2018b). These types of rules mean, for example, that 
‘phishing’ would be regarded as an enabler of computer misuse or fraud and so would not be 
recorded as a crime in itself. The principal goal of the offender’s crime (i.e. the resulting 
computer misuse or fraud) would be recorded insteadviii. With this in mind, it is generally not 
possible to know from most of the surveys and other sources on cyber crime whether the crimes 
being recorded would have been classed as ‘crimes’ in accordance with the HOCR. 
The linking of these rules and categories to recorded crime data gives the opportunity for more 
fine-grained analysis of the computer misuse crime types.  As an illustration, Table 4 compares 
findings from 2016 and 2017, with notable increases observed in the volume of reported viruses 
or other malware (up 145%); and also hacking of social media and email accounts (up 92%). 
<Insert Table 4 here>
While they provide a reference point for comparison in this context, the categories in Tables 3 
and 4 are just one way of viewing the problem.   As a contrast, Figure 2 presents the reporting 
categories offered to respondents in the aforementioned Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2018, 
along with the extent to which each had been encountered by respondents experiencing a 
breach in the prior year.  While the key themes from the HOCR set are still there, they are 
viii Furthermore, it is not sufficient to have just received a phishing attempt to have a crime recorded. The victim needs to 
have been specifically targeted and taken positive action in response (for example, upon receipt of the email, clicking the 
link directing them to a particular website, which then results in malware affecting their computer) – they then become the 
specific intended victim’.    
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grouped differently, with hacking-related incidents now getting two categories rather than five, 
and DoS attacks being covered in a single entry rather than two.  Meanwhile, although the 
category “Viruses, spyware or malware” is ostensibly similar to NFIB 50A, it is notable that 
ransomware is presented as a distinct issue from the rest of the malware, likely reflecting its 
prominence at the timeix. 
<Insert Figure 2 here>
Measuring cyber crime costs and harms
An alternative way to assess the cyber crime threat is through consideration of the costs and 
impacts experienced by individuals and businesses. Having an understanding of the costs of 
crimes is important to ensure that responses to crime are not simply targeted at those with the 
greatest volume of incidents, but also those with the greatest level of harm. It is important to 
know where costs fall (e.g. in prevention of a crime or in a response), what form those costs 
take and who is most affected (e.g. whether individuals or types of businesses) (Home Office, 
2018c).  
Available evidence suggests there are a variety of impacts that can result from cyber crime. For 
businesses, the Cyber Security Breaches Survey documents temporary loss of access to files or 
networks (reported by 23% businesses) and corruption or damage of software or systems 
(20%). However, the most commonly reported impact amongst businesses was the need for 
new security measures (38%), adding to staff time to deal with the breach or inform others 
about it (34%), and preventing staff from carrying out their daily work (24%).  Other less 
commonly reported impacts included reputational damage, customer complaints, and loss of 
revenue.   
Amongst members of the public, around one quarter of all computer misuse incidents reported 
in the CSEW resulted in the loss of money or goods, for year ending September 2017 (ONS, 
2018a). Of those that did experience a financial loss, around one per cent received full 
reimbursement for this loss. 
However, providing an accurate estimate of the total cost of cyber crime is no easy task. A 
report from the Costs of Cyber Crime Working Group (Home Office, 2018c) clearly outlines 
the challenges in formulating an accurate assessment and the limitations of a range of past 
efforts to calculate those costs. The report outlines how previous assessments of cost have 
typically been limited by inconsistent definitions of both ‘cyber crime’, insufficient 
consideration of the full range of potential resulting costs and varying types of costs being 
considered in the available estimates (e.g. sometimes intellectual property theft was included 
in an estimate, sometimes not). Fundamentally many studies simply did not measure the same 
thing (e.g. costs per incident vs, costs per year) making comparisons very difficult. The 
challenges in capturing more intangible costs associated with reputational damage from cyber 
attacks, was also noted.  
ix Ransomware is not distinctly specified in the HOCR, but is an example of where it would actually be helpful to have more 
fine-grained breakdown of some of the recorded crimes, in order to see how much of an issue ransomware has become when 
compared to other problems.
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Overall, the Costs of Cyber Crime Working Group report recommended further research for 
understanding costs of cyber crime, suggesting a broad framework to enable more consistent 
assessments of costs and harms. This framework draws upon three key dimensions previously 
used to assess costs associated with traditional crime:
 Costs in anticipation - e.g. defensive measures taken to prevent crime, such expenditure 
on anti-virus software.
 Costs as a consequence – e.g. those occurring as an immediate result of a crime, such 
as property damage or money lost, but also potentially encompassing emotional and 
physical harms from the crime. Victims may have little control of these costs.
 Costs in response – e.g. responses provided by police forces and the criminal justice 
system. These are costs for which there is likely to be more control. 
Further developments in this space can be found in a more recent Home Office publication, 
‘the economic and social costs of crime’ (Home Office, 2018d). Using the above framework, 
this report included an estimate for the first time of the cost of cyber crime - estimating this to 
be £1.1bn in 2015/16. However, it should be noted the estimate is regarded as partial (it 
excludes some key costs, such as those to businesses) and it also draws upon experimental 
CSEW statistics.
Once again though, our ability to apply clear and consistent definitions in the way we capture 
data on cyber crime will be key to informing the understanding in this area. With this 
information we can further build knowledge of the changing threat picture, as well as raise 
awareness of cyber crime and its impacts amongst law enforcement and those who can help 
tackle the problem. This will help enable more informed decisions about priorities and direct 
the appropriate awareness raising and prevention initiatives towards those who are most 
vulnerable.  
Adding depth of classification
As we have seen, the way things are labelled and grouped makes a difference to what is 
counted.  So, for example, while there are five variants of hacking under NFIB 52, there is only 
a single entry for ‘Computer viruses / malware / spyware’, suggesting less granularity of 
recording in this area.  Indeed, even the label itself prompts some discussion here, as the 
category might more reasonably be called ‘Malware’ (on the basis that viruses and spyware are 
actually two specific examples of the wider issue).  Indeed, the broad category doubtless hides 
more specific issues within it, and so provides a good opportunity to show how a particular 
category of cyber crime can be decomposed to differing levels of detail – as well as the 
implications and value (or otherwise) of doing so.  
Viruses were the first form of malware to come to widespread attention, in the latter half of the 
1980s, and the term has tended to become lodged in the public consciousness as a catch-all 
label. However, there are several other top-level classifications of malware that sit equally 
alongside it, several of which have been the more prevalent problems in recent years:
 Virus - A non-autonomous program that replicates and spreads by infecting (attaching 
itself to) systems, programs or files.
 Worm - Code that is able to replicate and spread autonomously through systems and 
networks.
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 Trojan horse - A program containing unexpected hidden functionality, potentially 
operating alongside expected behaviour
 Software Bomb – An element of malicious code, typically hidden within a larger 
program, that is activated on the basis of either a time-based trigger (time bomb) or a 
logical condition being met (logic bomb).
Although listed distinctly, these categories are not mutually exclusive, and may often be used 
in concert (e.g. a worm that distributes a Trojan, which then activates based on a particular date 
or after a period of time has elapsed).  Moreover, the variety of malware classification does not 
end here, and there are further categories and variations that name the malware based upon the 
purposes for which the techniques are being applied (and it is worth noting at this point that 
even the definitions are not definitive):
 Adware – software that automatically displays banner or pop-up advertisements, or 
redirect search requests to advertising websites. Adware is not necessarily malware, 
can be classed as such when used in the hands of cybercriminals.
 Crimeware – a broad category, referring to malware designed to conduct or enable 
illegal online activities.
 Ransomware – malware that blocks users’ access to their data (typically by encrypting 
it) unless a ransom is paid to recover it.
 Spyware – malware designed to gather and share information without the knowledge 
of the individual or organisation using the infected system.
Looking beneath this level there are various methods and techniques that can also be identified, 
such as keylogging and browser hijacking, which may be form part of the way in which 
categories such as spyware and crimeware conduct their activities.  To add to the potential for 
confusion, however, it is not uncommon to find keyloggers and browser hijackers also being 
referred to as forms of malware in their own right! Cyber security industry sources are more 
likely to refer to more fine-grained detail when reporting on types of cyber crime, however 
even then there is variation amongst reports and companies in terms of what is being reported, 
how it’s measured and what geographic coverage is being adopted (see McGuire and Dowling, 
2013) for more discussion on these issues). So again, a clear understanding of the domain can 
be complicated by the varying ways in which different parties choose to view it. While on one 
level this may seem like a pedantic discussion of wording, it has a genuine impact in terms of 
the ability to count, analyse, and understand the nature of the issues being reported. 
Indeed, such a breakdown could be further extended across other computer misuse categories 
as wellx.  However, aside from being potentially tedious, this would still not serve to yield a 
definitive or exhaustive list.  It is also unlikely that any victims would be able to accurately 
categorise the more detailed crime types, or in many cases provide any clear sense of attribution 
to the crime they experienced (for example, was money stolen from their online bank account 
a result of a virus or some other fraudulent method to obtain their funds?). At best, it would be 
a point-in-time snapshot, as the field is dynamic and the underlying labels are liable to ongoing 
expansion as new attacks and exploits emerge.  Indeed, experience suggests that threats rise 
and fall, and some tend to be more in focus than others at different points.  For example, at the 
x Phishing, for instance, can be further split down into categories including spear phishing (targeted at specific 
individuals or companies), whaling (targeting high-profile/high-value individuals within organisations), and 
catphishing (targeting individuals via online dating sites).
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time of writing, significant attention has been devoted towards ransomware, in the wake of 
incidents such as WannaCry and Petya (Burgess, 2017).   Meanwhile, phishing and mass 
exposure of user accounts are other examples of themes that have caught the headlines at 
different points.  At the same time, other forms of cyber crime remain an ongoing concern, and 
nothing really disappears entirely.  
As indicated, the specific fine-grained details of the incident types are not relevant to all 
scenarios.  From the victim perspective, there is not necessarily anything they would need to 
do differently in order to protect themselves against ransomware versus other types of malware.  
However, the details are relevant in order to understand how the attackers are operating and 
the methods they are using (e.g. how easily others might adopt them, how they might use them, 
and the potential for related incidents to spike as a result).
Every crime a ‘cyber’ crime?
As we move forward, there will be an undoubted broadening of cyber crime into new contexts.  
One perspective here is which technologies will be targeted and exploited for criminal 
purposes.  Experience has already shown that cybercriminals readily embrace new technologies 
as new routes, with attacks tailored to mobile devices having been a good example of this.  As 
technologies advance, there are clearly new opportunities to be had via routes such as the 
Internet of Things (IoT), smart homes, and autonomous vehicles.  Indeed, we have already seen 
early evidence of exploitation, with the Mirai botnet having caused a widespread denial of 
service attack via vulnerable IoT devices in late 2016 (US-CERT, 2016).   Similarly, research 
published at the time of writing revealed vulnerabilities in the Controller Area Network (CAN) 
protocol used within the vehicular internal networks of modern vehicles, which could be used 
to disable safety features and other internal components (Greenberg, 2017).
  
The earlier section made the distinction between cyber-dependent and cyber-enabled crimes, 
and this is indeed relevant if looking to broadly categorise them or start to build a taxonomy.  
However, with technology becoming ever more pervasive, will there come a point that the 
cyber prefix essentially becomes redundant, because so many forms of crime involve an IT 
element that it just merges into the background and becomes implicit?  Even now, what 
categories of physical world crime do not have a ‘cyber’, or ‘cyber-enabled’, equivalent? 
Financially-motivated crimes are already there.  Fraud, theft, blackmail, and ransom – all have 
made a transition into the cyber context, not least because it now represents the natural one in 
which the opportunities will arise.  Additionally, we have seen problems such as harassment, 
stalking, child sexual offences, and other interpersonal offences also acquire the cyber label. 
Indeed, in many ways the technology has again served the role as both an enabler and an 
amplifier for these, with online messaging and social networks providing the means to find, 
monitor and contact potential victims in a way that was not previously possible. Meanwhile, 
technology has also provided the means for perpetrators to try to hide and disguise their 
activities, through the use of techniques such as network anonymisers and cryptography.
It is interesting to get a direct measure of the extent to which this transition to the ‘cyber’ 
context has already taken effect. Unfortunately, there is no straightforward way to identify 
crimes conducted online in police recorded crime data, as enablers have not historically been 
captured in a systematic fashion. However, attempts have recently been made in England and 
Wales to better understand the volume of traditional crime that is conducted online via the 
introduction of an online crime ‘flag’ which police can apply to their crime reports. The 
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experimental data available for year ending September 2017, suggests that just 1% of all crime 
reports received by police was conducted online (ONS, 2018a). This appears instinctively too 
low and the reason the data remain experimental is that the quality being provided is poor and 
it is generally regarded that such crimes are not being flagged where they should be.  
Nonetheless, Figure 3 provides some sense of the distribution of all crimes flagged as ‘online’. 
Unsurprisingly harassment crimes represent the highest proportion (61%) of all ‘flagged’ 
crimes. However, the published findings also indicate that for some crime categories flagging 
is not as prominent as might be expected. For example, 44% of all obscene publications 
offences (which is where indecent imagery offences would be recorded) were flagged as online, 
and is rather lower than might be expected. Further work needs to be done to improve the 
quality of the reporting to help improve our picture here. 
<Insert Figure 3 here>
There is less direct parallel for some other physical crimes against people and things, but it is 
not infeasible to imagine a ‘cyber’ element becoming involved, particularly with the rise of the 
Internet of Things as an enabling platform.   For example, hacking someone’s medical device 
and causing it to kill them could easily justify the moniker of cyber murder, while causing a 
device to overheat could be a means of cyber arson.  Offences such as cyber assault and even 
cyber rape are not inconceivable if one extends the use and potential exploitation of vulnerable 
technologies far enough.  Indeed, using assault as an illustration, an example reported during 
the writing of this paper referred to a vulnerability in a car wash system being exploitable to 
cause to vehicles and physical attacks upon the people in them (Bisson, 2017).  
However, while the Internet or other technology may be involved in the commission of many 
different types of crimes, it is arguable that the cyber part is not the aspect that we ultimately 
care about; in these cases it is part of the means rather than the end. Many are simply traditional 
crimes committed using a different medium – they are not new crimes, nor are they necessarily 
that different to their offline form. Arguably then, not all crimes should be classified as “cyber 
crimes”. An alternative, purer framing of cyber crime would be one where only those offences 
that are cyber-dependent crimes (i.e. Computer Misuse Act crimes) are included. This would 
identify those crimes where the technology aspect is both the means and the target of the attack. 
The category of ‘cyber-enabled’ crime would then be reserved for offences where a traditional 
crime has been committed, but there has also been a clear Computer Misuse Act component 
involved (e.g. malware used to steal money from an online bank account). Collectively these 
offences would then be classed as true cyber crimes. This may help prevent increasing numbers 
of offences becoming classed as “cyber” crimes. All other crimes where the Internet or other 
technology is involved for purposes of communication, or facilitation - but has no element of 
computer misuse - would simply be labelled within the broader crime type that they represent.  
As such, online auction fraud would simply be classed as fraud; harassment via social media 
would simply be harassment, and so on.
Conclusions
Developments in how cyber crime is measured (e.g. through the Crime Survey, Action Fraud) 
means that we now have improved understanding of the scale and nature of cyber crimes 
experienced by the general population. We also have better understanding of how cyber crime 
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victimisation compares to other crime types. Better evidencing both scale and harms from 
cyber crime is important for informing appropriate responses to tackling cyber crime and also 
raising awareness amongst the general public and businesses of the need to undertake 
appropriate protective behaviours. In order to do this, there is a need to more consistently and 
accurately define what is meant by cyber crime and how to continue improving how we 
measure both the volume of incidents and the range of impacts or costs resulting from it. 
Accurate measurement of the scale and harms associated with particular forms of cyber crime 
is crucial to informing the extent and nature of policy, law enforcement and other responses 
directed at these crimes. Whilst not all crimes committed using the Internet or technology 
would require the same type of law enforcement response, the key safeguards and protective 
measures used by the public and businesses to protect against cyber crime are often fairly 
standard, and many of them apply across several online threats, as well as to supporting security 
beyond the specific scope of cyber crime.
However, there is also the question of what definition, categorisation or information about a 
crime do victims need to know to determine when, if, or how to report it to the appropriate 
authorities; or to trigger them to enact the necessary behaviour changes to better protect 
themselves in future. Clearly there are a number of levels of detail at which cyber crimes could 
be classed.  However only a small group of individuals involved in responding to the threat are 
likely to need the most granular information. In most cases we do not need to know the minutiae 
of the threats; we can simply accept that they exist, that they are significant, and that protection 
is required.  Nonetheless, this is perhaps easier said than done for large proportions of the 
population.  Indeed, there remain a number of challenges in informing public perceptions of 
cyber crime, raising awareness and changing behaviours – and based on the available evidence 
it would seem neither individuals nor businesses have yet developed sufficient awareness or 
the necessary behaviours. That being said, it is likely that a number of common cyber security 
behaviours (e.g. implementing strong passwords) may help to protect against a range of online 
threats. However, the human factors involved (e.g. being tricked into sharing a strong 
password) means that people may still be susceptible to a range of different crimes – some will 
be ‘true’ cyber crimes, others will be traditional crimes now conducted online.
Whilst the growing awareness of cyber crime is important, the varying definitions and the 
tendency to then treat every negative experience online as ‘cyber crime’ is probably less 
helpful. Not all crimes committed using the Internet or computers will require the same types 
of law enforcement response to tackle it. For example, a fraudulent eBay advertisement, an 
online harassment case, and a ransomware attack on a business are likely to warrant different 
responses and require different expertise to address. What degree of categorisation however is 
needed in order to provide the appropriate level of response? We would argue that at least 
generating a clearer distinction where ‘true’ cyber crimes are only those which are genuine 
cyber-dependent crimes and/or involve clear elements of Computer Misuse Act legislation, 
could help ensure that the appropriate response is directed to these types of crimes. It may also 
help to tackle general misnomers that anything with the prefix of ‘cyber’ is somehow scary, 
new, complicated or generally too difficult to deal with.   
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Figure 1:  Breakdown of CSEW crime types (year ending Sept 2017) and percentage change from year ending Sept. 
2016
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Figure 2:  Attacks reported in the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2018
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Figure 3:  Proportion of all offences recorded by police and flagged as ‘online’ crime, experimental 
statistics, year ending Sept 2017
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Types of breaches or attacks 
(CSBS 2018)
Threats increasing risk exposure 
(GISS 2017-18)
 Denial-of-service attacks
 Fraudulent emails or being directed to 
fraudulent websites
 Hacking or attempted hacking of online 
bank accounts 
 Others impersonating organisation in 
emails or online
 Ransomware
 Unauthorised use of computers, networks 
or servers by outsiders     
 Unauthorised use of computers, networks 
or servers by staff 
 Viruses, spyware or malware 
 Cyber attacks to steal financial information
 Cyber attacks to steal IP or data
 Internal attacks 
 Malware 
 Phishing
Table 1:  Comparison of attack categories used by prominent security surveys

















































































Fraud 3,617 3,239 -10 56
Bank and credit account fraud 2,452 2,390 -3 49
Consumer and retail fraud 939 747 -20 81
Advance fee fraud 118 56 -53 -
Other fraud 108 46 -57 -
Computer Misuse 1,966 1,503 -24 97
Computer virus 1,300 962 -26
Unauthorised access (including 
hacking)
667 541 -19
Total fraud and computer 
misuse
5,583 4,742 -15
Table 2:  Breakdown of CSEW fraud and computer misuse crimes and proportion flagged as “cyber- related”, year 
ending Sept 16 and Sept 17
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NFIB Code Crime type
NFIB50 Computer misuse crime
NFIB 50A Computer viruses / malware / spyware
NFIB 51A Denial of service attack 
NFIB 51B Denial of service attack (extortion)
NFIB 52A Hacking - server
NFIB 52B Hacking – personal 
NFIB 52C Hacking – social media and email
NFIB 52D Computer hacking – pbx / dial through
NFIB 52E Hacking / extortion
Table 3:  Home Office Counting Rules for Computer Misuse Crimes
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Computer viruses/malware 3,389 8,292 145
Denial of service attack 571 315 -45
Denial of service attack (extortion) 394 288 -27
Hacking – server 564 699 24
Hacking – personal 3,053 3,584 17
Hacking – social media and email 3,710 7,116 92
Hacking – PBX/dial through 538 420 -22
Hacking (extortion) 1,090 1,031 -5
Total all computer misuse crimes 13,309 21,745 63
Table 4:  Breakdown of computer misuse crimes reported to Action Fraud / NFIB, year ending Sept 2017
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Figure 1:  Breakdown of CSEW crime types (year ending Sept 2017) and percentage change from year 
ending Sept. 2016 
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Figure 2:  Attacks reported in the Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2018 
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Figure 3:  Proportion of offences recorded by police and flagged as ‘online’ crime, experimental statistics, 
year ending Sept 2017 
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